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Abstract
Background: Genomic testing has reached the point where, technically at least, it can be cheaper to undertake
panel-, exome- or whole genome testing than it is to sequence a single gene. An attribute of these approaches is
that information gleaned will often have uncertain significance. In addition to the challenges this presents for pre-
test counseling and informed consent, a further consideration emerges over how - ethically - we should conceive
of and respond to this uncertainty. To date, the ethical aspects of uncertainty in genomics have remained under-
explored.
Discussion: In this paper, we draft a conceptual and ethical response to the question of how to conceive of and
respond to uncertainty in genomic medicine. After introducing the problem, we articulate a concept of ‘genomic
uncertainty’. Drawing on this, together with exemplar clinical cases and related empirical literature, we then critique
the presumption that uncertainty is always problematic and something to be avoided, or eradicated. We conclude
by outlining an ‘ethics of genomic uncertainty’; describing how we might handle uncertainty in genomic medicine.
This involves fostering resilience, welfare, autonomy and solidarity.
Conclusions: Uncertainty will be an inherent aspect of clinical practice in genomics for some time to come.
Genomic testing should not be offered with the explicit aim to reduce uncertainty. Rather, uncertainty should be
appraised, adapted to and communicated about as part of the process of offering and providing genomic
information.
Keywords: Ethics, Uncertainty, Genomics, Clinical genomics, Massively parallel sequencing, Genome sequencing,
Genomic testing, Genetic counseling, Rare diseases, Variants of uncertain significance
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Background
Genomic sequencing is already aiding diagnosis in many in-
dividuals and families who until now have had unknown or
unexplainable causes for the conditions they live with [1].
Its use is increasing and there is enthusiasm for receiving
genomic information [2–4]. However while genetic testing
has always carried with it the prospect that uncertain infor-
mation would arise, [5, 6] the increased scale of genomic
testing methods such as panel-, exome- or whole genome
sequencing (and the information they could give rise to)
means that results with uncertain significance, uncertain
prognostic indicators or a meaning that changes over time
are now more prevalent [7–11]. Uncertainty is, and will
continue to be, inherent to genomic medicine [12, 13].
Accounting for uncertainty in genomics carries with it
clinical and counseling dimensions, such as appropriate
preparation for uncertainty and good communication [6,
8, 14] when information is uncertain. Empirical studies
are already providing useful data on how uncertainty is
approached by practitioners in genomics research and
clinical practice; as well as the impact it has on those
who receive information that is uncertain [8, 10, 12, 15,
16]. However we contend there is a negative presump-
tion underlying much current management of uncer-
tainty in genomics. Uncertainty tends to be framed as
inherently pejorative or harmful and something to be
avoided or eradicated. This also reflects more general
views on uncertainty in academic writing [17, 18], such
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as the assertion that “doctors… are learning to be afraid
of uncertainty [19].”
In this paper, rather than looking at the actual impact
of uncertainty, we focus on its normative status within
genomic medicine. We ask: how should we conceive of
and respond to ‘uncertainty’ in genomic medicine? Our
answer is that while we do not wish to underplay the im-
pact that uncertainty can have in genomic testing, a pre-
sumption that uncertainty is necessarily problematic or
needs to be eradicated should be rejected. We develop a
conceptualization of ‘genomic uncertainty’ and call for
its systematic and explicit incorporation into clinical
genomic practice1; a position that emphasizes ethically
relevant concepts such as resilience, welfare, autonomy
and solidarity. Additionally, while there are some forms
of uncertainty in genomics that it is desirable to try to
reduce, others can be framed as a source of options and
hope for the future [6].
Discussion
Conceptualizing ‘uncertainty’ and ‘genomic uncertainty’
Before discussing how we might account for genomic
uncertainty, we need to consider what is actually under
discussion when we speak of ‘uncertainty’. Uncertainty
is a cluster concept that has many different - but associ-
ated - meanings [14, 18, 20]. Broadly conceived, uncer-
tainty can be considered as a state of having imperfect or
unknown information.2
This imperfect or unknown information can arise in
genomics in at least two contexts: (i) clinical diagnosis
and (ii) clinical prognosis and/or management. It is also
a property that can be recognized subjectively (experien-
tially) by an individual provider or recipient of the infor-
mation, and/or viewed as an objective property of the
test or information itself.3
While a full survey of uncertainty scholarship is beyond
the scope of this paper, we have drawn on two formula-
tions to inform our conception of genomic uncertainty:
Han et al’s sources of uncertainty [21] and Babrow et al’s
forms of uncertainty [14].
Han et al. [21] describe uncertainty in terms of its
sources: probability; ambiguity and complexity. These
are properties of information that make it uncertain.
These sources are intrinsic to much genomic medicine,
in that uncertainty is characteristic of the information
communicated as part of genomic testing. Thus, we can
apply Han et al’s taxonomy as follows:
 Probability uncertainty occurs where there is
indeterminacy of future outcomes. Below, we
discuss the case of Jennifer (Case 1), who receives a
result that suggests she has a probability of
developing a highly invasive cancer. But it is
uncertain whether she will actually develop it.
 Ambiguity uncertainty arises when the information
or evidence is imprecise, where there is conflicting
opinion or where information is not known. Aisha
(Case 2 below) is experiencing ambiguity
uncertainty as we are unable to tell her the
significance of the 400 kb microdeletion identified in
her fetus.
 Complexity uncertainty arises when there are
features of the available information that make it
hard to understand. Factors such as epigenetic
effects, gene-gene or gene-environment interactions,
pleiotropy and unknown penetrance in previously
untested clinical populations mean that much gen-
omic information will have this property. Darnel’s
case (Case 3) exemplifies complexity uncertainty.
Babrow et al. caution that definitions of uncertainty
can be criticized for treating uncertainty as monolithic
[22]. They suggest five forms of uncertainty, which use
similar terminology to that of Han et al. but more expli-
citly account for how an individual will experience un-
certainty. We have applied these forms to genomic
testing as follows:
1. Inherent uncertainty: The test process may give rise
to uncertainty. There may be multiple causes of a
particular condition, not all of which might be
identifiable with current testing. The condition may
interact with others, affecting interpretation of
results. In advance, we cannot always be certain
about what results may arise or what they might
mean.4
2. Informational uncertainty: Uncertainty can arise
from the sufficiency, clarity, accuracy, completeness,
ambiguity, volume, reliability, consistency and
validity of information arising from genomic testing.
3. Views on uncertainty: This form of uncertainty
describes recipients’ views on the likelihood
(probability) of a certain test outcome.5 A recipient
may have a set probability in mind, or believe in a
range of probabilities that could arise from genomic
testing.
4. Structuring of information: Uncertainty can also
arise from how recipients might structure, order or
integrate the information they receive in genomic
testing with respect to existing beliefs, attitudes and
values.
5. Personal views about knowledge: Uncertainty can be
interpreted differently depending on variations in
individual attitudes towards ‘knowledge’. For
example, there will be different views on whether
uncertainty is tolerated, rejected or perhaps even
required in the pursuit of knowledge through
genomic testing.
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Babrow et al’s first and second forms of uncertainty
overlap with Han et al’s three sources of uncertainty. In
their third, fourth and fifth forms, Babrow et al. seem to
more explicitly recognize the experiential or subjective
properties of uncertainty. This is ethically relevant as
these may be more easily addressed by clinical encoun-
ters in genomics. Han et al., in contrast, seem to focus
primarily on properties relating to the test itself.
We build on these conceptualizations of uncertainty to
suggest the following definition of genomic uncertainty:
Genomic uncertainty is a status quo that arises when in-
formation that is obtained from genomic testing is im-
perfect or unknown, leading to uncertainty in clinical
diagnosis or management. Genomic uncertainty can
arise from the probabilistic, ambiguous or complexity
uncertainty inherent to the information arising from
testing, or from the provider’s or recipient’s views on
and uses of it.
Uncertainties relevant to genomics: exemplar clinical
contexts
Uncertainty can arise in any form of genomic testing.
However some indicative clinical case scenarios can as-
sist in illustrating how and when uncertainty can arise.
Consider the cases of Aisha, Jennifer and Darnel. These
scenarios all meet the definition of genomic uncertainty
as described above.
Case 1: Jennifer’s panel test [23]
Jennifer is 39 years old and is fit and well. However, she
is concerned about her mutation status for BRCA1 and
BRCA2 as she has a relevant family history. She there-
fore seeks testing. During the consent process for this
test, Jennifer is offered panel testing for 20 other cancer-
related genes. She agrees to receive this information.
Test results indicate a mutation in a gene responsible
for stomach cancer (but no BRCA1 or BRCA2 muta-
tion). One intervention to reduce this particular risk is a
surgical procedure that involves removing large portions
of the stomach. However, Jennifer has no family history
of this cancer and is keen to avoid unnecessary surgery.
“It’s so up in the air”, she says.
Jennifer’s test result has uncertainty for her ongoing
management. The mutation has a known etiology, but
her prognosis in the absence of any family history is un-
certain. The scenario would be indicative of at least Han
at al’s probability and complexity sources of uncertainty
and Babrow et al’s second (and possibly fourth) concep-
tions; uncertainty arising from the test and structuring
of information.
Case 2: Aisha’s test during pregnancy [24]
Aisha is a 29 year-old primigravid woman, who is 21 weeks
pregnant. A recent ultrasound indicated the presence of
some anomalies. As a result, Aisha is offered microarray
testing, with counseling. After careful consideration and
deliberation, Aisha and her partner decide to proceed with
testing. Results indicate a novel, de novo 400 kb microde-
letion that contains four genes. None of these genes are
known to be associated with human disease.
Aisha’s test result suggests uncertainty in both diagno-
sis and management. Aisha’s tolerance for uncertainty
will inform how her pregnancy progresses from this
point. It would meet at least Han et al’s description of
ambiguity uncertainty, and may also exemplify Babrow
et al’s inherent and informational forms, given that a
phenotype that correlates with this microdeletion cannot
be predicted.
Case 3: explaining Darnel’s cancer
Darnel is 47 years old and has experienced two episodes
of bowel cancer consistent with HNPCC. He has no
relevant family history, but given his cancer’s recurrence
and clinical presentation, a genetic link was suspected. A
panel test filtered to the genes associated with HNPCC
found no mutation.
Darnel’s result also indicates uncertainty in diagnosis
and management. It is an example of Han et al’s com-
plexity uncertainty (perhaps a gene-environment inter-
action), and Babrow et al’s inherent uncertainty.
Aisha, Jennifer and Darnel have received uncertain in-
formation following genomic testing. While we don’t
know enough from these descriptions to consider in de-
tail Babrow et al’s experiential forms of uncertainty
(their third, fourth and fifth forms), it is reasonable to
suggest that these individuals would have sought testing
to obtain information and presumably reduce uncer-
tainty [25–27]. Their cases highlight several consider-
ations such as the support recipients may need to both
adjust to living with uncertainty and make subsequent
decisions in light of the information they’ve received.
Supporting uncertainty through processes such as gen-
etic counseling is important, but is not the focus of this
paper. Instead, we question whether uncertainty should
always be treated and presented as something to be
‘avoided,’ [12] and the extent to which certain framings
might detract from more beneficial responses such as
encouraging resilience, promoting welfare and auton-
omy, and fostering solidarity. We go on to discuss that
uncertainty should be appraised as part of the process of
undergoing any genomic test.
What do we know about genomic uncertainty?
Empirical research into expectations and experiences of
uncertainty in genomics is now emerging, and measures
of responses to uncertainty are being developed [8]. Pre-
vious studies that looked at uncertainty in genetic testing
suggest that testing is sought to reduce uncertainty [25]
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or to end a diagnostic odyssey, [27] but that those who
do not achieve certainty are often nevertheless resilient
[28]. In a genomics context, ‘early adopters’ of genomic
testing tend to be comfortable with uncertainty, [29] al-
though if an individual perceives that genomic testing
results are going to be ambiguous they are more likely
to show reduced intentions to receive them or share
them with family [10, 30].6
Biesecker et al. [12] found that prior attitudes to genom-
ics (whether a person was generally more optimistic or
pessimistic) were relevant to individual attitudes towards
uncertainty; a point Babrow et al. [14, 22] also recognize
more generally. Several participants in Biesecker et al’s
study reported that uncertainty was normal and to be ex-
pected given the relatively recent emergence of genomic
testing. Concepts of opportunity and optimism regarding
the future also emerged. However, other participants
expressed disappointment and feelings of perplexity and
anxiety at having received uncertain information, and felt
less hopeful. We discuss this study and its recommenda-
tions further below.
Is uncertainty ethically relevant?
As a stand-alone concept, ‘uncertainty’ may not be inher-
ently ‘ethical’ in the way that other concepts often cited
in bioethics (such as ‘autonomy’ or ‘virtue’) are. Uncer-
tainty is, however, ethically relevant. For example, there
are both conceptual and empirical ties between notions
of uncertainty and hope [6, 13, 22, 31–33]. But experi-
ences of uncertainty might also mean that recipients of
uncertain genomic information may experience stress, a
reduced sense of coherence and loss of control.
Bauman posits a theoretical approach to ethics that is
guided by a ‘principle of uncertainty’ [34]. He claims that
uncertainty is a permanent aspect of our lives and can-
not be resolved through activities such as taking advice
or copying others. The sources and forms of uncertainty
in genomics can be said to fit this description. Bauman
then claims that any moral life is one that involves con-
tinuous uncertainty, reflecting an epistemological view
that would fit into Babrow et al’s fifth form (personal
views on knowledge). As such, Bauman claims that any
ethical theory needs to incorporate uncertainty.
Heath has also used work by Nussbaum and Toulmin
to claim that uncertainty is inherent to leading a life
worth living [19]. Our inability to control every aspect of
our lives and the unpredictable nature of our futures are
important aspects of living a rich life. Aiming for precise
prediction may set us up for a kind of genomic health-
care that is doomed to fail. Instead, we need to encom-
pass a model of care that builds in a recognition and
acceptance of uncertainty and all that this brings with it.
Han has written about the possible detrimental impact of
uncertainty on autonomy [20]. He claims that people need
and deserve uncertain information, as it can be autonomy-
promoting. However, the sources of uncertainty mentioned
above (probability, ambiguity and complexity) could also
give rise to harms such as anxiety - effectively undermining
rather than promoting autonomy.
Ethics and reducing uncertainty
We have seen so far that uncertainty is prevalent in gen-
omic medicine and that it is something that health pro-
fessionals working in genomics might want to avoid or
eradicate, given its apparent negative framing. Here we
suggest that clinical teams working with those who will
obtain genomic information like Jennifer, Aisha and
Darnel should focus explicitly on the role of uncertainty
in genomics during pre-test discussions; directly ac-
knowledging and appraising it rather than merely con-
ceiving of it as problematic or seeking to avoid a
negative response to it.
Our position reflects work by Babrow and Kline in the
context of breast self-examination [22] and also Skirton
and Bylund in genetics [16] Babrow and Kline make two
claims. The first relates to the rhetoric that often sur-
rounds a health intervention, namely its use as a means
of reducing “unpleasant uncertainty [22].” They observe
that breast screening does not necessarily reduce uncer-
tainty over breast cancer risk. The same is true for gen-
omic testing: it will not necessarily resolve uncertainty
over disease risk or prognosis and may lead to new
forms of uncertainty. This is not to say that breast self-
examination or genomic testing should not be promoted
or performed; but that the rhetoric of ‘test to reduce un-
certainty’ is not appropriate because this is not what
testing does.
Babrow and Kline’s second concern is more funda-
mental. It draws on the premise that we have identi-
fied earlier, namely that: “uncertainty can – and
should – be eradicated [22].” In both breast self-
examination and genomic testing (as well as, no
doubt, other health domains) testing tends to be of-
fered as a means of eradicating uncertainty; of getting
to ‘an answer’. However, as the above cases illustrate,
the testing process itself can either fail to resolve un-
certainty or introduce further uncertainty. It is intui-
tive to want to reduce uncertainty - as certainty may
bring with it perceived feelings of control, coherence
and reduced stress. However Babrow and Kline cri-
tique “the ideology of uncertainty reduction”; express-
ing concern over its “unreflective promotion.”
We agree that uncertainty should not necessarily be
framed as something undesirable that must be eradi-
cated. Rather, discussion of uncertainty should be inte-
grated into the entire genomic testing process in a way
so as to promote resilience if it is not resolved. Babrow
and Kline term this coping with uncertainty, which
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involves: appraisal, adaptation and complexity in com-
munication [22].
Appraisal involves examining the sources and forms
(and relevance [32]) of uncertainty that can arise and
then determining their value, disvalue or neutrality. Re-
sponses could be to reduce it (if an uncertainty is rele-
vant but negative, and can be reduced) or perhaps to
come to terms with it (if it is relevant, neutral but can-
not be altered). This may facilitate active coping or re-
silience in the face of uncertainty, rather than merely
tolerating it. It will also facilitate any positive uncertain-
ties to be used adaptively in counseling.
An appraisal process will require genetics professionals
and test recipients to work together to identify suitable
coping strategies and responses, such as emphasizing
continuity of care regardless of uncertainty. In Jennifer’s
case (Case 1), for example, the potential uncertainty
from the additional genes to be tested for in the panel
should have been discussed prior to testing. Jennifer
should have had an opportunity to consider potential
uncertainty and her attitudes towards it (whether posi-
tive, negative or neutral); and to work this into her
decision-making.
Adaptation involves active adjustment to the particular
kind of uncertainty that has arisen. Babrow and Kline
claim that this should involve understanding the particu-
lar nature of the uncertainty that has arisen (or may
arise) as well as critically appraising the information that
has been provided [22]. Aisha’s case (Case 2) illustrates
that adaptation in a genomics context will not always be
straightforward. It may involve providers having to crit-
ically appraise information that has shifting meaning and
may be significant in volume and detail. The source and
reliability of this information of uncertain significance
needs to be clearly explained, and Aisha (and her part-
ner) should be offered appropriate follow-up.
Acknowledging complexity in communication involves
understanding communication not as a one-way transac-
tion, but as something more complex. Resolving uncer-
tainty does not just involve providing better information
or adopting an approach such as “conveying these un-
certainties [12].” Communication needs to carefully ne-
gotiate uncertainty, taking into account the appraisal
and adaptation that has already taken place [22]. In
Darnel’s case (Case 3), this will also involve regular invi-
tations to re-engage with the team who provided testing.
This will enable his views on the results to be fed back
to the team, noting that his subjective experience of the
uncertainty may change over time. It will also allow add-
itional appraisal and adaption.
The practice we advocate here is consistent with pre-
dominant definitions of genetic counseling, which in-
cludes facilitating adaptation [35]. Skirton and Byland
have also described a similar process for managing
uncertainty [6]. However, we need to do more to step
away from any ideology around uncertainty eradication;
and re-frame uncertainty from something that is intui-
tively negative to something that is appraised (or man-
aged [6]) in a more value-neutral way. Additionally, this
discussion illustrates the necessity for genomic testing to
be accompanied by structured support for decision-
making - an approach that may not easily be sustained
by all models of genomic testing, such as direct to con-
sumer tests.
Towards an ‘ethics of uncertainty’
We have engaged with two claims in this paper: First,
that uncertainty is necessarily pejorative; and second,
that fostering an accurate understanding of the current
state of genomics will reduce adverse responses to un-
certainty [12]. We query both of these claims.
On the first claim, we have shown that uncertainty is
itself a complex concept; one that will manifest in differ-
ent ways in genomic testing. Testing can reduce some
kinds of uncertainty but it will not reduce all uncertainty
and may introduce new uncertainties. Drawing on work
from health communication, we have suggested that a
structured and supportive integration of uncertainties,
and a determination of reactions to them throughout
the genomic testing process, will help ensure that uncer-
tainty is constructively incorporated into clinical prac-
tice. This means that uncertainties can be characterized
in a variety of ways [36]. We should also recognize “…
that uncertainty can be a door to hope, an opportunity
or challenge, or a threat [14].”
As outlined above, Biesecker at al’s study suggests that
personal views will affect how someone responds to uncer-
tainty [12]. In response to their findings, they recommend
that in advance of genomic testing, researchers could
engage in “assessing and modifying these [participant’s] be-
liefs, through the provision of an epistemological [know-
ledge-based] intervention…”, adding that this “…may be a
key to enhancing informed choice and mitigating negative
responses to the uncertainty [12].” Their discussion also
suggests a presumption that uncertain results should always
be disclosed. However, we should not assume that potential
recipients of genomic information need to have their beliefs
modified so as to avoid a negative response to uncertainty.
This risks pre-empting judgements about what kinds of un-
certainty are appropriate. Rather than attempting to change
views, the process of managing uncertainty needs to both
attend to the more experiential aspects of uncertainty and
engage in appraisal, adaptation and complex communica-
tion. We therefore agree with Taber et al. that clinicians
should: “focus on addressing responses to perceived ambi-
guity rather than on reducing perceived ambiguity itself…”
[10] We also should not presume that uncertain informa-
tion (when it does arise) will always be returned to
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recipients. Rather, this is something to be negotiated as part
of the appraisal process.
Building an ethics of uncertainty into genomic medi-
cine can also draw on additional ethical concepts. We
suggest these can include promoting resilience, welfare,
autonomy and solidarity.
Resilience in the face of uncertain genomic information
can be said to be the ability of an individual or family to
deal effectively with information received. Encouraging re-
silience will recognize that the uncertainties in genomic
testing will impact those tested. The testing process and
outcome may be positive, neutral or negative, but it will
require some time to process. An approach that builds in
resilience will recognize this and will allow for some time
to ‘recalibrate’ following testing.
Similarly, promoting welfare among those undergoing
genomic testing will involve ‘looking out’ for their well-
being (that is, internal states such as happiness or satis-
faction of preferences) throughout the testing process.
The framing and handling of uncertainties may impact
welfare and the approaches we have discussed in this
paper may assist in welfare promotion. Part of this in-
volves getting the balance right between providing too
little or too much space for discussing uncertainty. For
example, an outcome harmful to welfare would be one
in which an uncertainty discussion resulted in that fact
alone meaning an individual eschewing information that
was clearly in her best interests to receive.
It could also be claimed that a truly autonomous deci-
sion to undertake genomic testing – one that demon-
strates individual or relational self-governance and critical
reflection, drawing on relevant beliefs and values – will
also incorporate a constructive and honest appraisal of un-
certainty. This involves working in partnership with those
undertaking testing; not merely leaving them to make a
decision, having been ‘educated’.
Han posits a relationship between access to information
and autonomy [20]. However, we should be wary of
assuming that all information is good or desired by its po-
tential recipients. Instead, we need to encourage critical
reflection on information – its kinds and its volume – and
the role that uncertainty plays in this. Seely et al. [18] sug-
gest that: “acknowledging uncertainty does not mean
abandoning patients to their autonomy… By acknowledg-
ing uncertainty within patient care, the physician-patient
relationship can be elevated to one of greater communica-
tion and shared decision-making.”
Finally, an approach to uncertainty in genomics can
build in solidarity. One definition of solidarity involves
signifying “shared practices reflecting a collective com-
mitment to carry costs (financial, social, emotional, or
otherwise) to assist others [37].” The ‘costs’ in this case
will be those arising from genomic uncertainty and its
effective appraisal. Recognising solidarity between
providers and recipients of genomic information will
emphasize mutual support, facilitating those undertaking
testing to feel that they are in partnership with those of-
fering it.
Conclusions
This Debate article offers the first normatively focused
consideration of the place of uncertainty in genomic
testing. We have considered how uncertainty is going to
arise in genomics and have offered a conceptualization
of ‘genomic uncertainty’. We have suggested that gen-
omic testing should not be offered merely as a means to
reduce uncertainty; nor should uncertainty necessarily
be framed negatively or as something that should always
be eradicated. Instead, the process of genomic testing
should include an explicit consideration of uncertainty,
[16] both before and after testing. This should not in-
volve mere education to reduce uncertainty, but encom-
pass a richer engagement involving appraisal, adaptation
and complex communication. We have also suggested
several ethical concepts that can guide how uncertainty
is handled: resilience, welfare, autonomy and solidarity.
For health professionals working in genomics, none of
what we have suggested will require significant changes
to practice. Rather, we offer this critique as a means to
ensure that genomics does not become too focused on
uncertainty reduction or eradication. Removing some
kinds of uncertainty can introduce other kinds; and un-
certainty can sometimes even be valuable or positive [22,
36]. It is encouraging to see counselors already publish-
ing about their experiences in handling uncertainty, in-
cluding the need to account for it explicitly [15, 16, 27].
Overall, the role of clinicians and counselors is to facili-
tate those receiving genomic information to come to
terms with the certainties and uncertainties that arise
during and after the testing process [38].
Endnotes
1A similar claim has been made by Hall et al. [39],
namely that the consent process should include discus-
sions of the possibility that results might be ‘inconclu-
sive’ and that this should be regarded as part of routine
practice. We also note that genomic testing, whether
somatic or germ-line, can lead to greater certainty too.
2This conceptualisation has been developed in collab-
oration with Dr Anthony Wrigley.
3As Babrow et al. [14] note, uncertainty can relate to
the status of a certain piece of information, or the order-
ing of several pieces of information, or how information
is synthesized. The information can also have properties
such as being incomplete or ambiguous.
4Babrow et al. term this aspect of uncertainty: ‘com-
plexity’, which Han et al. also use as a descriptor. Babrow
et al. use this term more broadly, describing it as the
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“complexity of whatever is at issue”, whereas Han et al.
use it to describe information. Therefore, we have
avoided using the same term twice.
5Note that Han et al. seem to refer to probability as it
relates to a source of uncertainty in the test itself;
whereas Babrow et al. discuss probability as it is experi-
enced by individuals.
6It is worth noting that Taber et al. (2015, cited at Ref-
erence [10]) found overall low prevalence of this kind of
attitude. However, many early adopters of genomic test-
ing are healthy individuals and their attitudes will not
necessarily be indicative of those of patients who live
with (or have a family history of ) a genetic condition.
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